Stacy K. Flannery Glenbrook South High School

In his book, The Strange Death of American Liberalism, H.W. Brands chronicles what he considers to be the rise and fall of American liberalism. Brands defines liberalism as "a prevailing confidence in the ability of government preeminently the federal government to accomplish substantial good on behalf of the American people" (vii). The author argues that Americans have always been conservative people who have a deep distrust of the government. Liberalism, according to Brands, has only prevailed during times when the national security of America was at stake. The threats posed during World War II and the Cold War inspired enough fear among the American people that they abandoned conservative ideology and instead turned to the federal government to protect them. Liberals seized this ideological shift and then justified a series of domestic "liberal" programs. When the threats posed by the Cold War dissipated in the late 1980s, so too did the liberal consensus.

The first two chapters of Brands's work trace what he believes to be the brief history of liberalism until World War II. The author quickly marches through nearly 150 years of history claiming that liberalism only existed periodically in times of war. Brands begins by analyzing the political ideology of the Revolutionary War generation. This generation carved history out of a basic mistrust of government in this case England. At the end of the war, most 18th century people wanted strong state and local governments over a strong national government. The debate that ensued between the Federalists (Hamiltonians) and the Republicans (Jeffersonians) was settled in a "compromise" called The Bill of Rights. According to Brands, "the price of ratification" (4) to the Federalists, nineteenth century Americans continued this trend and it is not until the Civil War that the issue of states rights was truly settled. Brands acknowledges the expanded role of government during the Civil War, but argues that most of the 19th century is dominated by conservative trends toward a limited national government. Even the Progressives were conservative because their goal was to empower government to prevent evil, "but almost none of them . . . had even a glimmering of what would characterize modem liberalism: a state where government didn't simply prevent evil but actively promoted good" (18).

It is hard to imagine anyone calling Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) a conservative, but Brands even argues that FDR's New Deal was conservative. The author points to campaign speeches made by FDR in the 1932 race against incumbent Herbert Hoover in which he pledged to reduce federal spending by 25 percent and accused the Hoover administration of being "the greatest spending Administration in peacetime history" (20). The New Deal, according to Brands, is "limited . . . considering the extent of the calamity the country was facing at the time" (21). Although Brands recognizes liberal pockets of the New Deal such as the National Recovery Administration and Social Security, he uses polling statistics from the 1930s to demonstrate that despite a "slight" departure from federal conservatism, people were concerned that government had grown too big during the decade. Brands never addressed the fact that despite the polling information, the American people validated FDR's policies four times on Election Day. More importantly, he ignores what I believe to be an ideological shift in the minds of Americans during this decade. Hoover, who stated that individuals must look out for themselves, and that the primary objective of government is to live within its means, lost the election of 1932. People looked to the government to help solve the challenges of the Great Depression.

World War II and the Cold War marked a liberal anomaly in United States history. Brands asserts that although Americans have a general distrust for government that distrust shifts to trust in the face of war. World War II and the Cold War marked a political "Golden Age" for liberals because the fear these two conflicts generated in the minds of Americans allowed for an expanded role for the federal government. The majority of Brands book focuses on the Cold War because "it created a national security bureaucracy that dwarfed anything Americans had tolerated before in peacetime" (66). This extended period of governmental trust provided a "political cover" (69) to those supporting liberal causes on the domestic front. Cold War fears led to trust that "government knew best" (73). Brands skillfully analyzes the administrations of Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon as liberal moments in United States history.

The liberal consensus meets its demise with the disillusionment caused by the Vietnam War and Watergate. The liberals, according to Brands, initially enjoy the destruction of Nixon until they realize that it discredited the thinking of the time, which had been one of their strongest arguments for reform. The Vietnam War "drove a stake through the heart of the popular confidence in government on which Cold War liberalism always rested" (101).

Despite Reagan's attempts to restart the Cold War rhetoric, the scars from the Vietnam War and Watergate are too deep. Reagan wanted Americans to distrust government at home, but have faith in government abroad. According to Brands, the historical evidence indicates that Americans have never been able to do this it is "all or nothing" (150) when it comes to governmental trust. Brands points out that the Clinton administration started out with liberal intentions, but when national healthcare tanked, and the Republicans swept Congress in 1994 with their "Contract with America" which emphasized less government, the remaining Clinton years were conservative. Clinton's scandals and Kenneth Starr's obsession to investigate those scandals further solidified American distrust of government.

Brands is quick to try and answer his critics by asserting that Cold War liberalism is an anomaly in United States history. He does not believe that conservatism and liberalism cycle in and out of the political landscape. Liberalism, according to Brands, is dead unless another Cold War like threat emerges.

I found The Strange Death of American Liberalism to be a very interesting and thought-provoking read. I agree with Brands that for the most part the American people are and always have been distrustful of government. However, I think that even though this distrust exists, the American people still expect the government to do a lot for them.

In his Afterward, Brands is quick to answer his future critics by responding to foreseen academic challenges. Liberals, he argues, will not be comfortable with his argument because they will see the New Deal as a watershed of postwar liberalism, Wilson and TR as ancestors to postwar liberalism, and postwar liberalism as a new economic paradigm I happen to agree with all of the above statements. The American people are pragmatic preservationists who are essentially conservative but are willing to expand the role of government it means preserving capitalism and democracy. The 20th century was a time of tremendous change and I believe that the federal government gradually altered itself (expanded) to meet the new challenges of the century.

Liberalism, according to Brands, is dead unless another Cold War like threat resurfaces. A 2001 copyright makes me believe that this book was published before the events of September 11th. It would be interesting to read an analysis of the George W. Bush administration in the context of this argument. I guess the liberals can find something good in the tragic events of that day if it opens up opportunities for more reform. George W. Bush seems to be going in the direction of Ronald Reagan, distrust for government at home, faith in government abroad. If Brands is correct, the American people are not going satisfied with this contradiction.

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